INTRODUCTION
Sir Winston Churchill is famously said to have characterised Soviet foreign policy as a puzzle inside a riddle wrapped in an enigma. Though the intrigues of geopolitics perhaps afford recourse to a loftier lexicon than that usually associated with discourse on the subject of financial reporting, he could just as well have applied his epithet to the vexed matter of goodwill and the accounting and reporting arrangements put in place from time to time to deal with it.
Scholars of accounting have long been all too aware of the difficulties associated with conceptualising, measuring and reporting on this financial Will-o'the-Wisp 1 . As far back as 1929, Canning noted that the main achievement of the literature accumulated on the subject of goodwill to that point was to generate a striking variety and number of disagreements on the issue. Plus ca change.
Indeed, the one apparent constant in the goodwill story is dissent, untempered by the passage of time, as to how best to deal with this black sheep of the balance sheet. In some cases this has manifested in the form of earnest (though mild) discussion as to whether goodwill, to the extent that it appeared on the balance sheet ought be labelled as a "fixed asset" or an "intangible asset" of the business (Fjeld, 1936; Walker, 1938) .
Some, apparently exasperated with the slipperiness of goodwill as a construct thought it ought to be expunged from the financial statements as soon as it had come into existence. Chambers supported this approach, objecting to goodwill's right to a place on the balance sheet by reason of its lack of "severability" and (to his eyes) lack of capacity to contribute to what he termed the "adaptability of the firm" (Chambers, 1966, p.218 ). Miller would also have consigned goodwill to immediate writedown. Such treatment, he argued, was the least worst means of resolving the fate of an illegitimate creature born of a wholly inadequate framework for the aggregation of assets (Miller, 1973) .
Gynther, on the other hand, thought it absurd to engage in rituals of mandatory amortisation and writedown of goodwill taking the view that it could (and ought) as confidently assert its membership of the on balance sheet asset club as other less colourful actors. Optimistic about rapid advancements in measurement techniques, he saw no objection to the recognition (via a continuous revaluation regime) even of that much dreaded sub-species, internally generated goodwill (Gynther, 1969) .
Given the maelstrom evident in the conceptual sphere, it is perhaps unsurprising that considerable turbulence has long been clearly evident in the world of practice. Early editions of Montgomery's Auditing 2 finger goodwill as a favoured tool of watered stock fraudsters and their fellow travellers, suggesting widespread licentiousness including the capitalisation of operating losses to goodwill -on the spurious theory that these had been incurred for the future economic betterment of the enterprise in question.
Add a (dirty) pool, write off against reserves, incant extraordinary expense, invert the sum of the years digits, misallocate purchase consideration to identifiable intangibles, about face and channel away from these back to goodwill, trim cash generating unit populations, massage 1 See: Lee, T., (1971) , "Goodwill: An Example of Will-o'the-Wisp Accounting", Accounting and Business Research, Autumn 1971, pp. 318 -328. 2 See for example the 5 th edition, p.312.
growth assumptions, compress discount rates. Round and round the cauldron go (Gibson & Francis, 1975; Wines & Ferguson, 1993; Day & Hartnett, 2000; Micallef & Eddie, 2001; Lonergan, 2006 ).
Yet in matters pertaining to the regulation of financial reporting, hope evidently springs eternal. Whatever had transpired historically, a clear break with the past was made when it became a requirement at law that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) would in Australia be the required basis for the preparation of financial statements 3 for all reporting periods beginning on or after January 1 2005. In many instances the transition to IFRS resulted in very little actual change. This was not so in the case of the new rules pertaining to goodwill accounting, which differed radically from their predecessors.
Consequently, informed by the turbulent history of goodwill accounting practice and theory, it is the objective of this paper to take the opportunity afforded by the emergence of the first substantial sample of financial statements prepared by large listed Australian companies under IFRS to peer into this brave (and complex) new domain with a view to forming an impression of its qualities.
In pursuing this objective, the remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of key developments in the regulation of goodwill accounting and reporting in Australia to date. Section 3 sets out details of the data sample and research methodology employed. Section 4 consists of a discussion of the results of the study, while section 5 contains some conclusions and suggests some implications of this study for practice and potential further research.
OVERVIEW OF GOODWILL REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS IN AUSTRALIA
Although goodwill had figured as an element of financial reports in Australia for an extended period (Standish, 1972) Prior to that time, an almost perfect regulatory vacuum surrounded financial reporting arrangements for goodwill in Australia, there being, in addition to a lack of accounting standards on the matter, no express requirements from other quarters such as stock exchange listing rules or the Companies Act. This set the Australian landscape at odds with the position in other jurisdictions, for example the United States, where pronouncements pertaining to goodwill had existed for several decades -for example, chapter 5 of Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 43, issued in 1953 , or APB 17, issued in 1970 to the advent of regulation in Australia, a melange of conflicting practices existed (Gibson & Francis, 1975) .
Evidently, that is how a substantial proportion of the reporting population liked things. AAS 18, calling as it did for the recognition and subsequent orderly amortisation of purchased goodwill against periodic earnings, was received with considerable indifference if not hostility by a significant proportion of Australian reporting entities, whose rate of compliance with the requirements of the new interloper was poor (Carnegie & Gibson, 1987) . They had that luxury. AAS 18 did not enjoy the force of law.
It required the introduction of Approved Accounting Standard ASRB 1013 Accounting for Goodwill, a standard backed by the force of law, to prod recalcitrant reporting entities into compliance. This standard, which required recognition and subsequent systematic amortisation of goodwill against periodic earnings, became effective for all reporting periods ending from June 1988 onwards. (Wines & Fergusson, 1993 ).
Yet even with the promulgation of a standard on goodwill backed by law, the regulatory victory was rapidly hollowed by innovation in practice. A favoured technique for avoiding the earnings dilutive consequences of ASRB 1013 was to place aggressive valuations on identifiable intangible assets obtained in corporate acquisition transactions, thus diminishing the residual difference between purchase consideration and the fair value of net assets acquired via the transaction -and consequently, the value ascribed to goodwill on acquisition. (Walker, 1989; Woolf 1989 ).
This form of regulatory arbitrage was possible because whereas a binding accounting standard existed in relation to goodwill, no standard governed reporting requirements for identifiable intangibles. Thus, while amortisation of goodwill against earnings was a requirement of ASRB 1013, no such express requirement existed in relation to identifiable intangibles. Value ascribed to these assets could therefore theoretically remain indefinitely untrammelled.
Noting this practice, the Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) issued Accounting Guidance Release No. 5, stipulating that all non current assets, tangible or intangible ought be written off against earnings on a systematic basis over the period during which benefits attributable to the items in question were expected to arise 7 . Lacking legal force, the compliance response was underwhelming (Goodwin & Harris, 1991) .
Further, while the rules governing goodwill restricted the capacity of reporting entities to employ large one-off write downs (or big bath accounting), no such restrictions formally existed in the context of accounting for identifiable intangible assets. This gave rise to a process which came to be known as the "intangible mirage", whereby having aggressively valued identifiable intangibles obtained in acquisition transactions, reporting entities thereafter wrote off large amounts of the resulting value as extraordinary items 8 , protecting future earnings streams from any revisionist, amortisation oriented regulatory change.
Appraised critically, the regulation of goodwill reporting arrangements essentially ossified in Australia from the late 1980s onwards. The Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) was replaced by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB). ASRB 1013 thus morphed into AASB 1013 -Accounting for Goodwill, with no initial modifications of any substance 9 .
Subsequently, after widespread controversy generated by the decision of a small number 10 of highly acquisitive Australian listed companies to apply the inverted sum of the years digits 11 method (ISOYD) as the basis for amortising goodwill, AASB 1013 was refined to expressly require an amortisation period of no more than 20 years coupled with mandatory application of the straight line method. (Day & Hartnett, 2000) Goodwill accounting practice in Australia can therefore be understood as having settled, between the mid 1980s when regulatory intervention was first systematically brought to bear and the advent of A-IFRS into a state of relatively sedate equilibrium. At one pole stood the influence of Applicable Accounting Standard AASB 1015 -Accounting for the Acquisition of Assets, which mandated the use of the purchase method for acquisition accounting 12 . At the other stood AASB 1013, which exhibited a strong bias against write off of goodwill in the immediate wake of an acquisition 13 and otherwise required the application of straight line amortisation of goodwill against periodic earnings over a period not exceeding twenty years.
This relatively sedate state of affairs was disrupted, to an extent, by revelations that the United States FASB had approved 14 the issuance of SFAS 141 -Business Combinations and SFAS 142 -Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets. In combination, these standards 9 AASB 1013 -Accounting for Goodwill was issued by the Australian Accounting Standards Board in June 1996 applies to financial years ending on or after 30 June 1996. 10 Day & Hartnett (2000) reported that from their sample of ASX 100 entities during the period of InvertedSum-Of-Years-Digits (ISOYD) method controversy, 47 exhibited evidence of goodwill amortisation charges, with 9 of these using the ISOYD method to determine annual amortisation charge. 11 This method serves to defer amortisation charges. Assuming a 20 year amortisation period, it results in approximately only 7% of amortisation charges taking place in the first five years post recognition, versus some 43% in the final five years of assumed life. Firms who adopted this technique argued that it placed them in a more internationally competitive position vis a vis other international firms. For example, FAS 72 -the US contemporary to AASB 1013 allowed amortisation over 40 years, while SSAP 22, the UK equivalent allowed the option of an immediate write-off of goodwill to reserves -or amortisation on a systematic basis over a (non specified) useful economic life (see Bryer (1995) for a historical overview of the introduction of SSAP 22 in the UK). Of course, none of this bookkeeping fiddling altered underlying cashflows -except insofar as lax accounting treatment for goodwill facilitated acquisition overpayment -something not at all clear from the empirical record. 12 The use of the pooling of interests method was proscribed. However, in the late 1990s / early millennium period, three Australian reporting entities participated in sanctioned breaches of this longstanding policy. These were, Brambles, which "merged" with GKN, CRA, which "merged" with Rio Tinto and BHP which "merged" with Billiton. Each of these corporate combinations took place in consequence of the creation of dual listed company structures. Each transaction was conditional upon receipt of regulatory approval (granted via Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Class Order No 98/100, dated 10 July 1998) for relief from Australian accounting standards pertaining to acquisition accounting, the capacity to adopt UK FRS, and the capacity to report locally in US dollars. Because FRS 6 (then operative) allowed the application of "merger accounting" (effectively a pooling approach) to certain eligible transactions, each of these DLCs (BramblesGKN, BHP Billion, Rio Tinto) was accounted for using merger accounting, with no resulting goodwill recognised on acquisition. However, transactions so structured represented the exception rather than the rule. 13 And in any event would require any such write-off to be expensed. 14 On June 29, 2001. There was unanimous assent on the part of FASB members.
proscribed the use of pooling approaches to acquisition accounting 15 , instead requiring purchase accounting, but on the other hand, removed the requirement for amortisation of goodwill against periodic earnings, instead allowing purchased goodwill to be held indefinitely at cost until impaired, at which time an appropriate write down against earnings would be required.
A number of technical articles published in Australia at this time questioned whether the failure of the Australian regulatory regime to immediately move to an impairment based regime similar to that in existence in the U.S after the promulgation of SFAS 141 and SFAS 142 might damage the capacity of Australian domiciled businesses to effectively compete on price on internationally contested acquisition transactions 16 (see -for example, Ernst & Young, 2001 ).
Irrespective of domestic lobbying efforts, it was perhaps inevitable given the emphasis placed on international harmonisation, that the U.S. move to an impairment regime coupled with the existence of a similar approach to goodwill accounting under the IFRS regime which was contemporaneously being promoted by the IASB, would jolt countries such as Australia which had maintained their own indigenous reporting standards into contemplation of their own course of action.
Ultimately, this crystallised with formal Australian adoption of IFRS 17 for reporting periods commencing on or after January 1 2005. The essence of the new regime (in comparison to the previous regime) can be understood with reference to four overarching themes.
The promulgation of an all encompassing applicable accounting standard dealing
with all intangibles -irrespective of whether or not identifiable, embodied in AASB 138 -Intangible Assets. 2. The continuation of the mandatory application of purchase accounting to corporate acquisition transactions -embodied in AASB 3 -Business Combinations. 3. The continuation of the prohibition on the recognition of internally generated goodwill, and by extension, the reversal of write-downs on purchased goodwillembodied in AASB 136 -Impairment of Assets. 4. The abandonment of the traditional recognition and amortisation approach to accounting for goodwill and the replacement of this rubric with an impairment regime, embodied in AASB 136 -Impairment of Assets, pursuant to which purchased goodwill may be held indefinitely at cost until impaired, with impairment devaluations being charged against earnings.
While the new architecture is relatively easy to comprehend in its broad dimensions, closer inspection, particularly of the provisions of AASB 136, reveals a foundation of enormous complexity. This is especially so in relation to the central matter of determining whether or not an impairment has occurred -a consideration which consumes 25 paragraphs (plus explanatory notes and appendices) within AASB 136. In determining whether such an event 15 The application of pooling based acquisition accounting had been common in the U.S to that point. 16 The general conclusion was that competitiveness on the acquisition trail would be undermined. Documents of this type strangely echoed lobbying documents which had been published during the mid 1990s by users of ISOYD amortisation by proponents of the freedom to use that approach. Predictably, those documents also claimed that tightening of amortisation rules would undermine international competitiveness. See -for example, Pacific Dunlop, 1994. 17 Usually referred to as A-IFRS in Australia.
has transpired, the standard instructs reporting entities to work through three fundamental steps.
First, existing goodwill must be associated with so called cash generating units -defined 18 as the smallest identifiable group of assets that generates cash inflows that are largely independent of the cash inflows from other assets or groups of assets, to the lowest level at which management monitors goodwill within the group. Next, the recoverable amount of the assets attributed to the selected cash generated units must be appraised. This will equate to the higher of fair value less disposal costs and value in use. Finally, to the extent that the carrying amount of assets within a cash generating unit exceeds the recoverable amount, an impairment must be recognised.
Application of the impairment testing regime mandated under AASB 136 results in a densely congealed fog of assumptions. Attempting to independently assess the degree to which impairment testing has proceeded on a fair and reasonable basis without an understanding of at least the key components of this miasma would necessitate the further elevation of faith as a key skill of the financial statement analyst.
However, in a reaffirmation of the value of scepticism (at least in capital market settings), AASB 136 mandates a number of disclosures which drive to the heart of the manner in which the recoverable amount of cash generating unit assets have been determined, and thus provides the potential for independent reflection by financial statement users on the impairment testing process. It is these mandated disclosures which hold the key to the enigma the subject of this paper -the operation of Australia's brave new world of goodwill impairment testing, and it is to these and their significance that the next section of the paper turns.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
For reasons set out in above, 2006 represents the first year in which substantial quantities of financial statements prepared by Australian listed corporations in accordance with the requirements of A-IFRS have become available for inspection. Given that our research objective is to develop an impression of the manner in which the Australian goodwill reporting regime has unfolded in this initial implementation period, the research focuses on data drawn from a sample of the 20 largest Australian listed corporations (as measured by market capitalisation) as at 2006. This sample is advantageous for several reasons. First, the twenty organisations within the sample represent approximately one third of the total market capitalisation of the Australian Stock Exchange during the period under review. Thus, though small in number, the value coverage achieved by concentrating on these leading stocks is high.
Second, the sample consists of an almost even balance of financial firms (banks and insurers) and non-financial firms. This allows the development of preliminary insights into whether cross sectional variation between the approach to goodwill reporting taken by financial firms versus non-financial firms is evident.
Finally, the election of a parsimonious sample allows a greater degree of forensic concentration on the details of each sample firm's implementation of the new goodwill reporting rules, allowing for potentially sharper and richer characterisation of practice choices and variations, which may contribute to the design of better subsequent large sample empirical studies on this theme. Details of our research sample are set out in Table 1 , below. Several dimensions of the goodwill reporting regime are of potential interest and can be investigated by dint of required disclosures under AASB 136. The first relates to the role of cash generating units (henceforth CGUs) as the crucible within which the impairment testing process transpires.
Paragraph 80 of AASB 136 requires that for the purpose of impairment testing, goodwill be allocated to each of the reporting entity's cash generating units (or groups of cash generating entities) which are expected to benefit from the goodwill. To avoid the creation of an excessive reporting systems burden, this allocation is only required down to cash generating units or groups of cash generating units which represent the lowest level at which goodwill is monitored for internal management purposes. However, to guard against excessive aggregation, paragraph 80 stipulates that the cash generating units (or groups thereof) should not be larger than segments defined for the purpose of segment reporting 20 .
This is important, because the number of cash generating units to which goodwill is allocated for the purposes of impairment testing itself has the capacity to impact on the likelihood of an impairment loss being recognised. A simple example will illustrate. Contemplate an airline company, X Ltd. This firm operates a highly profitable domestic passenger airline business and an international passenger airline business which exhibits lower average margins and far higher result volatility, under the same brand.
The domestic network operates and is capable of being sustained independently of the international network, and vice versa. If both segments are combined into just one CGU, the consistent results of the domestic portion will tend to smooth the volatility inherent in the international portion -and in consequence, it is likely that a discounted cashflow approach to determining the recoverable amount of the assets deployed by the business will result in greater "head room" over and above the carrying value than would be the case were each treated as an individual CGU.
Thus, in coming to understand the characteristics of the goodwill reporting regime, developing an understanding of the apparent level of aggregation of CGUs as defined by reporting entities is of prime significance. This is pursued by comparing the number of reported controlled subsidiary entities, business segments and defined cash generating units for each firm in our sample.
Having examined the aggregation issue, attention is turned to manner in which recoverable amount of CGU assets has been estimated. This requires reference to fair value or value in use, and disclosure which of these reference bases has been adopted.
While AASB 136 calls for limited disclosure of the assumptions and processes used by an organisation which has elected to use fair value as the benchmark for impairment testing 21 , several specific and detailed disclosures are called for in the event that value in use is the basis adopted for the determination of recoverable amount. These appear designed to assist financial statements users to assess the robustness of the discounted cashflow modelling process used to estimate recoverable amount, and include; (i) a description of each key assumption on which management has based its cash flow projections for the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts. Key assumptions are those to which the unit's (group of units') recoverable amount is most sensitive 22 ;
(ii) a description of management's approach to determining the value(s) assigned to each key assumption, whether those value(s) reflect past experience or, if (iii) the period over which management has projected cash flows based on financial budgets/forecasts approved by management and, when a period greater than five years is used for a cash-generating unit (group of units), an explanation of why that longer period is justified 24 ;
(iv) the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections beyond the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts, and the justification for using any growth rate that exceeds the long-term average growth rate for the products, industries, or country or countries in which the entity operates, or for the market to which the unit (group of units) is dedicated 25 ; and (v) the discount rate(s) applied to the cash flow projections 26 .
Inspection of the assumptions made in relation to key factors such as discount rates, growth rates, forecast periods and terminal value periods supports the development of a more nuanced comprehension of the degree of conservatism or aggression inherent in the development of value in use estimates, meaning that these are also of primary interest in developing an understanding of the operation of the goodwill reporting regime.
A final matter of interest, having regard to the detailed disclosure provisions set out in AASB 136 is to reach an overall determination as to the degree of apparent compliance with the requirements of the standard. Each sample firm was evaluated according to the quality of its disclosures pertaining to:
1. Valuation impairment method adopted; 2. Whether all goodwill clearly allocated to CGUs; 3. Discount rate / rates used in cashflow modelling; 4. Growth rates used in cashflow modelling; and 5. Periods to which disclosed growth rates apply.
Firms which provided precise information on each of these dimensions were evaluated as fully complying with the disclosure requirements of AASB 136, those which provided precise information on most dimensions but inexact information on one or two of the five dimensions were evaluated as partially complying. In those instances where a lack of precise information against the five dimensions predominated, the sample firm was evaluated as non compliant 27 .
The results of the analytical procedures employed for the purposes of the study are reported in section 4, below. 27 Taking the dimension "discount rate" as an example, a complying firm would specify a particular rate -say, 11%. A partially complying firm would specify a range of rates -say, 11 -13%, while a non complying firm would indicate that a discount rate had been used, but not provide sufficient commentary to allow a confident estimation of the discount rate employed in the modelling process to a reasonable degree of certainty.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The first matter to which attention was turned was the question of the degree to which goodwill was allocated to CGUs as required under paragraph 80 of AASB 136, for the purpose of initiating the impairment testing process. Findings in relation to this threshold question are set out in tables 2 and 3, dealing respectively with the financial and non-financial firms in our research sample. Tables 2 and 3 show high levels of compliance with the requirement to allocate goodwill to CGUs, with 17 of 20 firms in the sample fully compliant -in the sense that the total value of goodwill recorded on the sample firm consolidated balance sheet could be reconciled to the total dollar value of goodwill allocated to disclosed CGUs. Three firms did not fully comply with this requirement.
The first of the non complying firms was ANZ. Its consolidated financial statements show $2.9 billion 28 of total goodwill, but $72 million of this was not allocated to a CGU. Interestingly, ANZ defined only 1 CGU (compared to 5, 3 and 3 for the other direct competitor "big four" Australian banks included in the sample) -but offered no explanation as to the failure to allocate this amount.
Macquarie Bank allocated none of the $83 million recorded as goodwill to a CGU -possibly, in light of its $106 billion balance sheet, on the grounds of materiality 29 . Again, no explanation for this treatment was offered. Finally, Coles Group -whose goodwill represented almost 10% of the value of that firm's total assets as at the measurement date failed to allocate any of its goodwill to a CGU. No explanation was offered.
These exceptions aside (and the Coles case appears particularly striking), the level of compliance with this basic allocation requirement was high. Particulars for each firm are set out overleaf. 28 All dollar values discussed within the paper are in Australian dollars unless otherwise stated. 29 However, Paragraph 134 of AASB 136 appears to suggest that the relevant materiality threshold is not the size of the balance sheet as a whole, but rather, the total carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite lives. On this approach, the use of a materiality based argument for non allocation is more difficult to defend. The next layer of the analysis was aimed at the acquisition of evidence bearing on the question of possible aggregation of CGUs, with implications for the degree of vulnerability to impairment losses. Data pertaining to this issue are set out in tables 4 and 5 -dealing, respectively with the financial and non-financial firms in the sample.
This data provides some evidence that aggregation of CGUs beyond the level intended within AASB 136 has taken place. In the case of the financial firms sampled, in only one instance did the number of defined CGUs exceed the number of business segments. In three further cases, the number of defined CGUs equalled the number of disclosed business segments.
However, in four of eight financial firms sampled, either no CGU was defined, or the number of CGUs defined was lower than the number of disclosed business segments. In some cases, the results appeared patently absurd. For example, if ANZ bank's disclosures are to be taken literally, the highest level of resolution with which management manages the firm's goodwill is at the level of a single lump almost $3 billion in magnitude 33 .
The results for the non-financial firms conformed closely to those for the financial firms in the sample -with exactly the same proportion of these, 50%, defining fewer CGUs than business segments. Two of twelve defined more CGUs than business segments, while in the remainder of cases, the same number of defined CGUs as disclosed business segments were observed. The non-financial firms exhibited greater variation in the absolute numbers of CGUs defined -with Telstra exhibiting no fewer than 11, and Tabcorp Holdings close behind at 9, versus CSL with only one CGU to which some $735 million in goodwill had been allocated.
A final reference point in assisting interpretation of this data is to examine the relationship between the number of controlled entities reported as in existence at balance date, and the numbers of business segments and CGUs. Although certainly not a perfect proxy for prior acquisition activity 34 , a review of the number of controlled entities may point to the variety of occasions in past in which an acquisition event potentially triggering the existence of goodwill has taken place.
The higher the frequency of such episodes, the greater the potential that a higher number of differentiable business segments and CGUs exists. Contemplation of this data yields a number of anomalies which suggest that this may be a useful variable in future more detailed empirical studies. For example, Fosters Group Limited (FGL) had by far the highest number of controlled subsidiary entities 35 , yet a relatively low number of CGUs. 33 If true, ANZ's shareholders ought to be concerned, since the value ascribed to goodwill represented approximately 15% of total shareholder funds as at 2006. 34 Particularly in the context of financial institutions which may configure large numbers of special purpose vehicles to house particular transactions to which they are party, or organisations making extensive use of asset leasing arrangements (in our sample an example is Qantas), which for taxation and legal reasons are also often quarantined into multiple special purpose vehicles. 35 Many of which were, by inspection, acquired rather than created internally. The next data set, relating to discount rates used in discounted cashflow modelling of value in use (where this was the method used to assess recoverable amount) is presented in tables 6 and 7 -incorporating financial and non-financial company observations, respectively.
Only three of the eight financial institutions provided detailed disclosure pertaining to the discount rates applied in cashflow modelling. In three of eight cases, this was as the result of an election to adopt a fair value approach to the assessment of recoverable amount. This left Macquarie Bank, which made no disclosures at all (consistent with its failure to allocate any goodwill to CGUs), Suncorp, the National Australia Bank (NAB) and Westpac Banking Corporation -the last three of which used a value in use approach.
Though the number of observations from this portion of the sample is too low to sustain comprehensive analysis, it is of interest that both Westpac and NAB used only one discount rate as the basis for modifying the estimated cashflows from all business segments. Yet AASB 136 makes it plain that the discount rate adopted for the purpose of estimating the recoverable amount of the asset base of a CGU ought to relate specifically to the business risk of that particular CGU, not simply whole of firm cost of capital.
Therefore, either each of the CGUs used by these organisations display an eerie homogeneity of underlying business risk, or there must be room to at least raise questions about the appropriateness of the discount rates used to model recoverable value in some of these organisations' CGUs. Given the potentially material sensitivity discounted cashflow models can exhibit to relatively small changes in discount rates, this is a matter for concern.
A similarly concerning pattern emerges for the non-financial firms. In six of ten cases in which useful observations were gathered in relation to discount rates 36 , a single discount rate was used across all defined CGUs. As noted above, it seems most unlikely in point of fact that the business risk of each of these CGUs is in fact as homogenous as the discount rate data suggests.
No attempt has been made to evaluate the absolute level of business risk inherent in each organisation in the sample and to compare that to the discount rate adopted for the purpose of the recoverable amount estimation process undertaken by the sample firms. However, this would appear to be a potentially fruitful exercise for future research projects concentrating on the IFRS goodwill reporting and impairment regime. n/a n/a n/a ANZ 1 fair value n/a n/a n/a WBC 7 1 10.50% 10.50% 10.50% MBL no disclosure no disclosure n/a n/a n/a SGB 4 Range 13.00% 18.00% 15.50% 37 SUN 2 fair value n/a n/a n/a IAG 4 no disclosure n/a n/a n/a 40 CGJ provided explicit disclosure of the pre-tax discount rate used for one CGU (Food, Liquor and Fuel -11.00%), however no disclosure was provided on discount rates for the remaining 4 CGUs. 41 TOL provided explicit disclosure of the pre-tax discount rates used for three of the smallest CGUs (Networks, Toll North & Logistics), however no disclosure of discount rates was provided for the remaining three CGUs. These three CGUs (Patrick, Pacific National & SembLog) were allocated $5,552 million in goodwill, which comprised 98.11% of the total goodwill for the firm. Curiously, TOL did not consider the 62.4% controlling interest in Virgin Blue to be a CGU, despite the fact that this business segment has more than 4100 employees, 53 planes and contributed revenues of $252 million since acquisition during the 2006 financial year. n/a n/a n/a n/a ANZ fair value n/a fair value n/a n/a n/a n/a WBC 3 no disclosure 1 no disclosure no disclosure 2010 0.00% MBL no disclosure no disclosure no disclosure no disclosure no disclosure no disclosure no disclosure SGB 3 no disclosure 1 no disclosure no disclosure 2010 3.75% SUN fair value n/a fair value n/a n/a n/a n/a IAG 5 no disclosure 1 no disclosure no disclosure 2012 no disclosure The patchiest disclosures provided by sample firms -both financial and non-financial related to growth periods and rates. These variables are as material to the determination of discounted cashflow as discount rates. The lack of refined detail presented by most of the firms in our sample appears to cut against the grain of the requirements defined in AASB 136, and result in the clouding of a vital window into the impairment testing process. The data in tables 8 and 9 above suggest considerable room for improvement of the quality of these disclosures in future.
The final tables, 10 and 11 overleaf, present an overall evaluation of the degree to which the firms in the research sample (financial and non-financial respectively) complied with the detailed disclosure requirements of AASB 136. Overall, 7 from 20 (35%) of the research sample were judged to have fully complied with the requirements of the standard, with another 8 from 20 (40%) exhibiting partial 46 compliance. However, a quarter of sampled firms appeared substantially non compliant.
While the final evaluation set out in tables 10 and 11 is principally a summarisation of data appearing in less aggregated form above, one additional dimension, the identity of the firm's auditor is added. This appears to have some explanatory value, with Ernst & Young clients appearing to comply more frequently and more fully than clients of the other audit firms represented. This may prove a useful insight for future more detailed studies. 
CONCLUSION
The results of this limited sample analysis suggest that there is room, certainly in the Australian context where the application of an impairment based regime for goodwill accounting and reporting is novel, for further detailed research. This may also extend to new opportunities for international comparative studies, which can be enriched by the inclusion of data from an economically significant jurisdiction such as Australia.
In particular, there appears to be further room for examining the determinants of the number of CGUs defined by reporting entities, and modelling the implications of this choice. It would also appear that there are substantial opportunities for more detailed evaluative studies with a focus on the implications of the discount rates selected by reporting entities for the purposes of recoverable amount evaluation. Finally, the preliminary results suggest substantial room for the contemplation of audit related variables, or indeed for assessed compliance levels with applicable accounting standards to factor as a useful variable in studies of audit quality and effectiveness.
The results of this study demonstrate, in part, the very great degree of change to goodwill accounting and reporting norms which has resulted from the implementation of A-IFRS. They also clearly suggest that this change in practice has not represented a panacea. It may thus be confidently predicted that upon the occasion of the centenary of Canning's assessment of the literature on goodwill, a similar conclusion to that which he reached in 1929 will still be clearly supportable.
